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Using a comprehensive linked employer-employee database from Brazil for the period 1995-2001,
we are able for the first time to compare firms founded as employee spinoffs to new firms without
parents and to diversification ventures of existing firms entering a new industry. Employee spinoffs
are defined either as the director/manager having moved from a parent in the same industry or as one-quarter
of the employees having shifted from a common parent. Depending on definition, employee spinoffs
account for between one-sixth and one-third of the new firms in Brazil’s private sector during this
period. Regardless of definition, size at entry is larger for employee spinoffs than for new firms without
parents but smaller than for diversification ventures of existing firms. Similarly, exit rates for employee
spinoffs are less than for new firms without parents and comparable to those for diversification ventures
of existing firms. These results suggest that we can think of some part of a firm’s productivity draw
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Where do new ﬁrms come from? One answer is from other ﬁrms: ﬁrms lose employees,
who spin off to form their own businesses. Employee spinoffs have been found to be a major
source of new ﬁrms in widely varying contexts. According to the 1992 Economic Census
of the United States (Bureau of the Census 1997, p. 86), 45.1 percent of non-minority male
business owners “previously worked for a business whose goods/services were similar to
those provided by the [current] business.” Also for the United States, Cooper (1985, p. 77)
reports that 60-70 percent of new full-time businesses and about 85 percent of technically
orientedﬁrmsservesimilarmarketsorutilizesimilartechnologiesastheorganizationswhich
the entrepreneurs had left. Bhid´ e (2000, p. 54) reports that 71 percent of the ﬁrms in the
Inc 500 (a list of young fast-growing ﬁrms) were founded by entrepreneurs who “replicated
or modiﬁed an idea encountered through previous employment.” Rona-Tas (1997, Table 2)
ﬁnds that in 1993-4 most of the CEOs at top privately founded (not privatized) ﬁrms in
Hungary and the Czech Republic had been high or middle managers in state-owned ﬁrms
in 1988. Finally, Elkan (1988, p. 174) states that a “survey of the hundred or so largest
Nigerian industrial businesses in 1975 reported that 68 percent had been founded by former
employees of expatriate ﬁrms.”
It is difﬁcult to ascertain how important are employee spinoffs on the basis of these
studies. The studies either use unrepresentative samples of new ﬁrms or do not use precise
criteria to deﬁne employee spinoffs. In this paper we will, for the ﬁrst time, (1) compute
the share of employee spinoffs in a representative sample of new ﬁrms using precise and
replicable criteria, and (2) compare basic indicators of their performance to those of other
entrants. For (2) we follow the classic work of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and
examine ﬁrm entry size and exit rates relative to both new ﬁrms that are not spinoffs and
existing ﬁrms entering new industries. Dunne et al. used U.S. data and did not distinguish
spinoffs from other new ﬁrms. We use Brazilian data because they allow identiﬁcation
of employee spinoffs. Moreover, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor consistently ranks
Brazil among the most entrepreneurial economies in the world, measured by the prevalence
of nascent and new ﬁrms in the economy (Reynolds, Hay, Bygrave, Camp and Autio 2000,
Minniti, Bygrave and Autio 2005).
Employee spinoffs are of special interest because they raise important policy issues, es-
pecially in a less developed country context. Should an employee spinoff be allowed to
compete with the former employer? Employers may be discouraged from entry or from in-
vesting in the human capital of their employees if they cannot prevent their employees from
starting competing businesses or “stealing” their clients. In more developed countries, a
potential solution to this dilemma is for employees to sign covenants not to compete with
their employers, which they must buy out if they wish to spin off. If bargaining is efﬁcient,
they will buy out these contracts when their spinoffs yield efﬁciency gains, thereby reim-
bursing employers for their human capital investments and still realizing the beneﬁts to the
economy of competition and growth. In less developed countries, however, employees are
2likely to be liquidity-constrained. At the other extreme, such contracts between employers
and employees may not be enforced at all.
Before we know whether such policy issues deserve priority for further study, we need
to know the quantitative importance of employee spinoffs. Our results for Brazil during the
period 1995-2001 are that, depending on spinoff deﬁnition, employee spinoffs account for
around one-sixth of new ﬁrms with salaried management and for one-third of new ﬁrms with
ﬁve or more employees—excluding those new ﬁrms with state ownership, cooperatives, any
type of holding company, and foreign subsidiaries. Regardless of spinoff deﬁnition, size at
entry for employee spinoffs is larger than for new ﬁrms without parents but smaller than for
diversiﬁcation ventures of existing ﬁrms. Similarly, exit rates for employee spinoffs are less
than for new ﬁrms without parents and comparable to those for diversiﬁcation ventures of
existing ﬁrms. These results suggest that we can think of some part of a ﬁrm’s productiv-
ity draw in the Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992) models as embodied in the ﬁrm’s
employees and portable by them to a new ﬁrm.
Section 2 provides an overview of the literatures on employee spinoffs and divestitures.
Section 3 describes the data source. Section 4 introduces our classiﬁcation of new ﬁrms into
employee spinoffs, divestitures and other types. Section 5 presents comparative statistics on
employee spinoffs and other new ﬁrms. Section 6 documents the performance of employee
spinoffs over time, relative to other types of new ﬁrms. Section 7 concludes. The Appendix
provides details on the data source and the empirical implementation of deﬁnitions.
2 Related Literature
The earliest papers on employee spinoffs were motivated by very high-proﬁle examples in
the U.S. high-tech sector. Subsequently the literature broadened beyond this narrow focus.
After all, standard problems with eliciting effort inside organizations (Alchian and Demsetz
1972, Holmstrom 1982) can motivate employee spinoffs in any sector of the economy. In
thispaperwewillnotbeconcernedwiththe“why”ofemployeespinoffs, butwenevertheless
cover a number of hypotheses in the course of our literature review.
In the literature on employee spinoffs in the high-tech sector, a popular explanation for
spinoffs is that employees may have private information about technological discoveries they
make in the course of their employment at incumbent ﬁrms, and may want to leave the com-
pany to exploit these promising discoveries because various agency costs impede employ-
ees from contracting with their ﬁrms to develop discoveries (Anton and Yao 1995, Wiggins
1995). Another explanation is that incumbents may be slow to pursue technological in-
novations made by employees because of organizational difﬁculties, compelling employees
to leave the company to commercialize on their own. Such organizational difﬁculties can
arise when the innovations require incumbents to signiﬁcantly alter their businessapproaches
(Henderson and Clark 1990), when incumbents do not possess the competencies required to
pursue the innovations (Tushman and Anderson 1986), or when the innovations appeal to
3new users of a product but not to current customers of incumbents (Christensen 1993).
The more recent literature considers explanations for employee spinoffs other than tech-
nological innovations. Klepper and Sleeper (2005) and Franco and Filson (2006) argue that
employees may simply want to exploit knowledge they learned during their employment to
become competitors with their former employers. Rauch and Watson (2004) model the case
where the knowledge exploited by employees is the needs and preferences of their former
employers’ clients, whom they “steal” when they establish their own ﬁrms. Employees need
not go into competition with their former employers, however. “Vertical” spinoffs are also
possible, in which employees who manage production of inputs within their ﬁrms become
external suppliers of these same inputs—a version of the “make or buy” decision in which
the employee rather than the employer (or the employee in consultation with the employer)
decides on external versus internal supply (Rauch 2008).
The literature on high-tech spinoffs also investigates their performance. In particular,
spinoffs are compared to new plants of parents with the idea that new plants of existing ﬁrms
exploit employees’ innovations in house. Parents or “incumbents” may have some advan-
tages of scale, scope, tax, or information that will allow them to commercialize a discovery
made by employees more proﬁtably than a new ﬁrm started by employees (Klepper 2001).
Complementary assets of incumbent ﬁrms such as production capabilities, sales channels
and marketing capabilities may be crucial to bring innovations to the market quickly and
successfully (Teece 1986). On the other hand, spinoffs are free from “organizational iner-
tia” that incumbents might possess, and which can prevent incumbents from adjusting to a
new environment (Hannan and Freeman 1984, Henderson and Clark 1990). New plants of
incumbent ﬁrms are more likely to inherit established processes and routines of their parent
ﬁrms, which may prevent them from acting quickly, especially when the industry they enter
is rapidly changing. In this regard, the models of Anton and Yao (1995) and Wiggins (1995)
suggest that the innovations commercialized by spinoffs are more likely to be path-breaking
or to be opening new submarkets. If that conjecture is correct, spinoffs may show greater
success than new plants of incumbents.
As the more recent literature has broadened away from high-tech spinoffs so that pos-
session of a technological innovation is not required to start a new ﬁrm, it has compared the
performance of spinoffs to that of other new ﬁrms rather than to new plants of existing ﬁrms.
Cabral and Wang (2008) have a model and evidence from the automobile industry show-
ing that spinoffs from surviving ﬁrms are superior to other new ﬁrms because the spinoffs
are self-selected from all employees for entrepreneurial talent, whereas spinoffs from dying
ﬁrms are negatively selected (at least relative to spinoffs from surviving ﬁrms) because all
employees are looking to “jump ship” regardless of entrepreneurial ability. Hvide (2005)
argued and presented evidence that spinoffs from large ﬁrms should be positively selected
relative to spinoffs from small ﬁrms, because small ﬁrms can accurately recognize and re-
ward employee ideas whereas large ﬁrms can only offer a higher wage, leading employees
with the very best ideas to leave and start their own ﬁrms.
A separate literature analyzes divestitures and corporate spinouts. In contrast to an
4employee-initiated spinoff, a divestiture is a management-initiated new ﬁrm. Common
forms of divestitures are corporate spinouts into standalone ﬁrms, or new ﬁrms that emerge
as the results of parent ﬁrms’ mergers and acquisitions, or new ﬁrms from a splitup of the
parent ﬁrm into separate companies through equity transfers. Similar to the literature on em-
ployee spinoffs, one branch of the divestiture literature asks why ﬁrms divest. Cusatis, Miles
and Woolridge (1993) argue that divestitures help a parent ﬁrm restructure and save cost by
alleviating the management’s span-of-control problem when companies grow large. Krish-
naswami and Subramaniam (1999) emphasize that a splitup of parent-ﬁrm divisions into sep-
arate companies resolves informational asymmetries between investors and managers about
the proﬁtability of individual divisions. Chemmanur and Yan (2004) point out that divesti-
tures shrink the parent ﬁrm so that a takeover by outsiders becomes more likely, serving to
discipline the incumbent management and thus improving parent-ﬁrm performance. Also
similar to the literature on employee spinoffs, a branch of the divestiture literature com-
pares performance. Cusatis et al. (1993) document that, in addition to abnormal positive
stock returns for the parent ﬁrm on the divestiture announcement date, both divestitures and
their parents experience signiﬁcantly positive abnormal returns for up to three years after
announcement. Nandy and Chemmanur (2005) use large U.S. plant panel data, combined
with stock return data for their ﬁrms, and document that productivity improves at the parents’
plants and, to a lesser degree, at the divested plants upon divestiture, compared to plants at
ﬁrms with no divestiture. We will see in sections 4-6 below that distinguishing between
divestitures and employee spinoffs is quite important in our data.
3 Data
We adopt a workforce-based deﬁnition of spinoffs and use employer-reported occupations.
We study Brazilian data, where detailed occupational codes are available.1 Our data derive
from the linked employer-employee records RAIS (Relac ¸˜ ao Anual de Informac ¸˜ oes Sociais
of the Brazilian labor ministry MTE), which record comprehensive individual employee in-
formation on occupations, demographic characteristics and earnings, along with employer
identiﬁers. By Brazilian law, every private or public-sector employer must report this in-
formation every year.2 De Negri, Furtado, Souza and Arbache (1998) compare labor force
1To our knowledge, occupational information is currently neither available in the U.S. Longitudinal Re-
search Database (LRD) nor in the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data base. In LEHD,
educational information on the workforce is imputed by census tract. The reason for imputation is that U.S.
unemployment insurance records, on which the employer-employee link is based state by state, do not typically
offer educational information. But occupational information has not been imputed to date.
2RAIS primarily provides information to a federal wage supplement program (Abono Salarial), by which
every employee with formal employment during the calendar year receives the equivalent of a monthly min-
imum wage. RAIS records are then shared across government agencies. An employer’s failure to report
complete workforce information can, in principle, result in ﬁnes proportional to the workforce size, but ﬁnes
are rarely issued. In practice, employees and employers have strong incentives to ascertain complete RAIS
5information in RAIS to that in a main Brazilian household survey (PNAD) and conclude
that, when comparable, RAIS delivers qualitatively similar results to those in the national
household survey. Menezes-Filho, Muendler and Ramey (2008) apply the Abowd, Kra-
marz, Margolis and Troske (2001) earnings-estimation methodology to Brazil and show that
labor-market outcomes from RAIS broadly resemble those in France and the United States,
even after controlling for selection into formal-sector employment, except for unusually high
returns to high school and college education and to experience among males. Appendix A
presents further details on the data source.
A job observation in RAIS is identiﬁed by the employee ID, the employer’s tax ID
(CNPJ), and dates of job accession and separation. To avoid double-counting employees
at new ﬁrms, we keep only one observation for each employer-employee pair, choosing the
job with the earliest hiring date. If the employee has two jobs at the ﬁrm starting in the same
month, we keep the highest paying one. The rules on tax ID assignments make it possible to
identify new ﬁrms (the ﬁrst eight digits of the tax ID) and new plants within ﬁrms (the last six
digits of the tax ID). Appendix B discusses the relevant details on tax ID assignment. Our
data include 71.1 million employees (with 556.3 million job spells) at 5.52 million plants in
3.75 million ﬁrms over the sixteen-year period 1986-2001 in any sector of the economy. We
limit our attention to the years 1995-2001 to ensure that ﬁrms we label as new have not oper-
ated before. In addition, RAIS offers detailed industry information (at the four-digit CNAE
level) starting in 1995. During this 7-year period, 1.54 million new ﬁrms and 2.17 million
plants entered (of which 581 thousand new plants were created within incumbent ﬁrms). By
1995 macroeconomic stabilization had succeeded in Brazil. The Plano Real from August
1994 had brought inﬂation down to single-digit rates. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who
had enacted the Plano Real as Minister of Finance, became president, signalling a period of
ﬁnancial calm and ﬁscal austerity. Apart from a large exchange-rate devaluation in early
1999 and a subsequent switch from exchange-rate to inﬂation-targeting at the central bank,
macroeconomic conditions remained relatively stable for the following years.
Occupational classiﬁcations in RAIS follow the CBO (Classiﬁcac ¸˜ ao Brasileira de Ocu-
pac ¸˜ oes). This classiﬁcation system with more than 350 categories allows us to identify
management employees (directors/managers) for speciﬁc spinoff deﬁnitions. During our
sample period, sectors are reported under the CNAE four-digit classiﬁcation (Classiﬁcac ¸˜ ao
Nacional de Atividade Econˆ omica) for 654 industries, spanning all sectors of the economy.
The level of detail is roughly comparable to the NAICS 2007 ﬁve-digit level. RAIS reports
earnings as the monthly average wage, expressed in multiples of the current minimum wage.
We use the log of December wages as our earnings measure in performance analysis, deﬁned
as the reported December wage times the December minimum wage expressed in Brazilian
Real, and deﬂated to the August 1994 level. Appendix A has further details on the earnings
measure.
records because payment of the annual public wage supplement is exclusively based on RAIS. The ministry of
labor estimates that well above 90 percent of all formally employed individuals in Brazil are covered in RAIS




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Table 1 describes the data with respect to business formation. In 1995-2001, the num-
ber of formally registered ﬁrms grows from over one million to close to 1.5 million, cor-
responding to an annualized rate of growth of around 6.6 percent. There is considerably
more gross entry, however. Around 18.3 percent of ﬁrms in 1995 are new, and around 15.9
percent in 2001 are new, implying that exit plays an important role for net growth in the
number of ﬁrms. An early peak in the formation of new ﬁrms occurs in 1997. By then the
stable macroeconomic environment and the government’s continued commitment to market-
oriented policy offered a conducive environment for entrants. A concerted effort by the
federal government since 1996 to reduce informality in the labor market may also have con-
tributed to a higher rate of formal registration among entrants. To control for cohort-speciﬁc
entry and survival patterns, our regression speciﬁcations will condition on cohort effects.
We deﬁne ventures as groups of new plants within ﬁrms. Around one to three percent of
existing ﬁrms expand, diversify or otherwise grow new ventures either by starting new lines
of business or by acquiring existing ventures (2.7 percent in 1995, 1.4 percent in 2001). We
use the CNAE 4-digit industry of the new ventures and the existing ﬁrm to discern between
expansions, deﬁned as new ventures within the same CNAE 4-digit industry, and diversiﬁca-
tions, deﬁned as new ventures in a different CNAE 4-digit industry. In the early years, when
sector information is less well reported (many undetermined sectors), expansions are slightly
more frequent than diversiﬁcations. Once sector information is highly complete, however,
the data show that expansions within the same industry are about 60 to 80 percent more fre-
quent than diversiﬁcations. Over time the total numbers of expansion and diversiﬁcation
plants tend to increase or decrease together, but the number of plants per expansion venture
tended to fall during the seven years whereas the number of plants per diversiﬁcation venture
tended to increase. Although expansions average more than two plants and diversiﬁcations
more than ﬁve plants, the median number of plants for both is one. A minority of multi-
plant ventures therefore drives the difference in average number of plants between ventures
of existing ﬁrms and new ﬁrms. We now turn to the importance of employee spinoffs among
the new ﬁrms.
4 Spinoff and Divestiture Deﬁnitions
We take two complementary approaches to identifying employee spinoff ﬁrms in the RAIS
data, andleteachapproachactasacheckontherobustnessoftheother. Intheﬁrstapproach,
we locate the human capital essential to founding the new ﬁrm in its director or manager.
Deﬁnition A. (Director/manager spinoff.) A director/manager employee spinoff is a new
ﬁrm whose top paid director (or top paid manager if there are no directors) previously
worked for an existing ﬁrm in the same 4-digit CNAE industry.
The top paid director or manager may be the owner of the ﬁrm, or may have recruited
ﬁnancial backing from investors who own the ﬁrm but are not employed by it. Alternatively,
8investors may have recruited an experienced director or manager to run a new ﬁrm that was
their idea. In the latter case, some (but not all) of the human capital essential to founding the
new ﬁrm is embodied in the unobserved investors. Note that the director/manager spinoff
deﬁnitionwillmissmany“vertical”spinoffs, inwhichthetoppaiddirectorormanagerleaves
his existing ﬁrm to independently produce an input he previously supplied to his former
employer internally.3 For example, an accountant for a manufacturing ﬁrm may start an
accounting ﬁrm that caters to manufacturing industry. His new ﬁrm will not have the same
4-digit CNAE as his former employer and will therefore be missed by the director/manager
spinoff deﬁnition.
Our second approach locates the human capital essential to founding the new ﬁrm in a
group of employees that embodies its “core competence.” Of course the core competence
of a ﬁrm is unobserved, so we do not know which or how many employees embody its core
competence. For help we turn to a fact about director/manager spinoffs: on average, the di-
rector/manager “brings along” from the parent 23 percent of the non-management employees
of the new ﬁrm.4 This suggests that a reasonable cutoff for the share of employees in the
new ﬁrm that is needed to transfer essential technologies or work routines from the parent
ﬁrm is one-quarter.
Deﬁnition B. (Quarter-workforce spinoff.) A quarter-workforce employee spinoff is a new
ﬁrm of ﬁve or more employees, at least 25 percent of whom previously worked for the same
existing ﬁrm.
We restrict this deﬁnition to new ﬁrms with ﬁve or more employees, because below
ﬁve employees any new ﬁrm with an employee who can be traced to previous employment
would automatically be a spinoff. In other words, by restricting ourselves to ﬁrms with ﬁve
or more employees, we ensure that a “team” that embodies the core competence of the new
ﬁrm must have at least two employees. An advantage of the quarter-workforce deﬁnition
over the director/manager deﬁnition is that we are not restricted to ﬁrms with a paid director
or manager, nor are we restricted to “horizontal” spinoffs. The obvious disadvantage is that
without the presence of a director or manager it is entirely possible that no essential human
capital is embodied in the group of employees.
Both spinoff deﬁnitions A and B are vulnerable to the problem that the offspring ﬁrms
may not be truly new. An existing ﬁrm that divests itself of one or more divisions creates
a “new” ﬁrm that is likely to satisfy both of our spinoff deﬁnitions.5 We receive some help
with this problem from the coding of ﬁrms by natureza juridica (legal form) in the RAIS data
set. By Brazilian commercial law, there are two broad categories of legal form: incorporated
3These vertical spinoffs are extensively documented for Taiwan in Chapter 7 of Shieh (1992).
4That is, on average 23 percent of the non-management employees of Deﬁnition A spinoffs, as counted in
Table 3 below, are from the same parent ﬁrm as the top paid director or manager.
5One might think the same problem could arise if a ﬁrm is sold, creating a “new” ﬁrm that is again likely to
satisfy both of our spinoff deﬁnitions. However, as discussed in Appendix B, a ﬁrm that is sold retains its ﬁrm
identiﬁer and therefore is not coded as a new ﬁrm in our data.
9ﬁrms, and associations or partnerships without independent legal existence. Most important
for our purposes, associations or partnerships cannot be owned by companies, but only by
physical persons. So, if an employee spinoff is an association or partnership, it is not
likely to be a divestiture (spinoff legal forms). In contrast, spinoffs that are incorporated
as Corporation under private control, Close corporation, or Limited liability company are
quite possibly divestitures (gray area legal forms). Inverting the common criterion in the
labor literature that a mass layoff is a reduction of the existing workforce by 30 percent
or more (e.g. Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993), we label a new ﬁrm a divestiture if
its natureza juridica is coded as Corporation under private control, Close corporation, or
Limited liability company, or if it has unknown legal form, and if it absorbs 70 percent or
more of the employees of a plant of an existing ﬁrm.6
Deﬁnition C. (Divestiture.) A divestiture is a new ﬁrm with natureza juridica coded as Cor-
poration under private control, Close corporation, Limited liability company, or as unknown
that absorbs 70 percent or more of the employees of a plant of an existing ﬁrm.
Finally, we exclude from spinoffs, and from the performance analysis of the next section,
branches of government, ﬁrms with state ownership, cooperatives, any type of holding com-
pany, and branches of foreign ﬁrms. For our exhaustive classiﬁcation of natureza juridica
into spinoff legal forms, gray area legal forms and excluded legal forms, see Table C.1 in the
Appendix.
Deﬁnition D. (New ﬁrm with excluded legal form.) A new ﬁrm with excluded legal form is a
new ﬁrm with natureza juridica coded as Public administration, State-owned limited liability
company, State-owned close corporation, Corporation with some state control, Cooperative,
Consortium, Business group, or Branch of foreign company.
Table 2 summarizes the resulting exhaustive and mutually exclusive classiﬁcation of new
ﬁrms under Deﬁnitions A through D. Appendix D describes the classiﬁcation procedure in
precise detail.
5 Employee Spinoffs and Other New Firms
We now turn to descriptive statistics that characterize the groups of new ﬁrms under our
deﬁnitions. Note that the pool of new ﬁrms from which Deﬁnition A spinoffs can be drawn
6We use the share of employees of an existing plant rather than an entire existing ﬁrm because a typical
divestiture scenario is one in which a parent ﬁrm divests itself of a particular plant, which becomes a new ﬁrm.
This conservative approach makes it more difﬁcult to classify a new ﬁrm as an employee spinoff. Benedetto,
Haltiwanger, Lane and McKinney (2007) use a cutoff of 80 percent of the employees of an existing ﬁrm
shifting to another ﬁrm in order to cross-validate ﬁrm dynamics from administrative ﬁrm records with worker
ﬂow information. So as to check for the potential sensitivity of our later results to our choice of the cutoff at
70 percent, we control for the share of parent employees shifted in robustness regressions.
10Table 2: CLASSIFICATION OF NEW FIRMS
Type of New Firm Spinoff Mass Employee Legal Form
criteriaa Shiftb of New Firmc
Unrelated new ﬁrm no yes or no spinoff
Unrelated new ﬁrm no no gray area
Employee spinoff yes yes or no spinoff
Employee spinoff yes no gray area
Divestiture yes or no yes gray area
Excluded legal form yes or no yes or no non-spinoff
aThere are two spinoff criteria: director/manager (Def. A) and quarter-workforce (Def. B). The direc-
tor/manager criterion isolates the top employee at each new ﬁrm ﬁrst by CBO occupation (where director
trumps manager, which trumps other occupations), and second by wage. The last ﬁrm at which this top em-
ployee worked for at least three months is deﬁned as the new ﬁrm’s parent. If this parent is within the same
sector as the new ﬁrm (where we use the sectors associated with the shifting employee at the two jobs), and
the top employee is a manager or director, we label the new ﬁrm a spinoff (Def. A). If there are two or more
director/manager employees tied for top employee, the ﬁrm is labelled a spinoff if any one (or all) of these
managers’ parent ﬁrms is in the same sector as the new ﬁrm. So multi-parent spinoffs are possible (rare in
practice). The quarter-workforce criterion considers the previous employer (employment for at least three
months) of all the new ﬁrm’s employees, regardless of job description or pay. The parent ﬁrm is the ﬁrm that
lost the largest number of employees to the new ﬁrm. The new ﬁrm is labelled a spinoff as long as it has at
least ﬁve employees, and 25 percent or more of them come from the parent ﬁrm. Multi-parent spinoffs are
again possible.
bShift of 70 percent or more of the parent plant workforce to the new ﬁrm. The parent plant is the plant of
the parent ﬁrm that lost the largest share of its employees to the new ﬁrm, where the parent ﬁrm is the last ﬁrm
at which a new ﬁrm’s top employee worked for at least three months under the director/manager criterion and
parent ﬁrm is the ﬁrm that lost the largest number of employees to the new ﬁrm under the quarter-workforce
criterion. If there are two or more parent ﬁrms, we keep the one within the same sector as the new ﬁrm for the
mass employee shift criterion; remaining ties are broken at random to select a unique parent. The parent plant
workforce is the employees ever employed during the year before the new ﬁrm’s entry. If the new ﬁrm has no
known parent, or this parent was not present during the previous year (so we cannot obtain its employees), we
consider the mass employee shift criterion as not satisﬁed. The mass employee shift criterion of 70 percent is
an inversion of the common criterion for a mass layoff, by which a mass layoff is a reduction of the existing
workforce by 30 percent or more (e.g. Jacobson et al. 1993).
cForourclassiﬁcationintospinofflegalforms, grayarealegalformsandexcludedlegalforms, seeTableC.1
in the Appendix.
Note: Legal form according to natureza juridica variable in RAIS.
11Table 3: NEW FIRMS AND VENTURES WITH DIRECTOR/MANAGER
Employment Wage Bill
Type of New Firm or Venture Count (thousands) (BRL million)
New Firm
Employee spinoff (spinoff legal form) 2,647 78 38
Employee spinoff (gray area legal form) 10,349 291 133
Divestiture 3,307 343 202
Unrelated new ﬁrm (spinoff legal form) 17,811 140 50
Unrelated new ﬁrm (gray area legal form) 42,383 690 313
Excluded legal form 2,341 223 128
Venture of Existing Firm
Diversiﬁcation venture 6,879 778 429
Undetermined sector venture 808 41 25
Total 86,525 2,584 1,318
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms and venturesof existing ﬁrms with at least one director/manager. Brazilian
Real (BRL) deﬂated to August 1994.
Note: Deﬁnition of new ﬁrms as in Table 2. Deﬁnition of ventures as in Table 1.
is restricted to those with at least one director or manager, and the pool of new ﬁrms from
which Deﬁnition B spinoffs can be drawn is restricted to those with at least ﬁve employees.
Table 3 covers the former pool of ﬁrms and Table 4 covers the latter pool of ﬁrms. Each table
presents counts of new ﬁrms, employment and wage bills by type of new ﬁrm in the upper
panels.7 In the lower panels, the tables also report the according statistics for diversiﬁcation
ventures and undetermined-sector ventures of existing ﬁrms (as deﬁned in Table 1), under
the additional restriction that the ventures have at least one director or manager or that the
ventures have at least ﬁve employees. These categories of ventures are added so we can
make the same comparisons as in Dunne et al. (1988) between new ﬁrms and entry into new
industries by existing ﬁrms. We do not consider expansion ventures in our comparisons,
following Dunne et al. (1988) for whom expansion ventures are not a form of entry.
There are 76,497 new ﬁrms (other than excluded legal form) with at least one director
or manager in Table 3; this is a share of 5.0 percent of all new ﬁrms. In contrast, there are
331,987 new ﬁrms (other than excluded legal form) with at least ﬁve employees in Table 4,
a share of 21.5 percent. So having a director or manager proves to be much more rare than
having ﬁve or more employees.
We see from Tables 3 and 4 that diversiﬁcation ventures make up only 8.0 percent of
7Employment and wage bill ﬁgures are the ones recorded in December of the new ﬁrms’ ﬁrst year of
appearance in RAIS. Averaging employment and wage bills over the entire calendar year is too cumbersome in
RAIS.
12Table 4: NEW FIRMS AND VENTURES WITH FIVE OR MORE EMPLOYEES
Employment Wage Bill
Type of New Firm or Venture Count (thousands) (BRL million)
New Firm
Employee spinoff (spinoff legal form) 31,543 374 125
Employee spinoff (gray area legal form) 65,708 1,034 391
Divestiture 18,099 659 324
Unrelated new ﬁrm (spinoff legal form) 63,980 605 117
Unrelated new ﬁrm (gray area legal form) 152,657 1,738 419
Excluded legal form 8,869 1,013 531
Venture of Existing Firm
Diversiﬁcation venture 30,279 1,503 657
Undetermined sector venture 4,452 90 38
Total 375,587 7,015 2,603
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms and ventures of existing ﬁrms with at least ﬁve employees. Brazilian Real
(BRL) deﬂated to August 1994. Employment in thousands, wage bill in BRL million.
Notes: Deﬁnition of new ﬁrms as in Table 2. Deﬁnition of ventures as in Table 1.
new ﬁrms and ventures with director/managers and 8.1 percent of new ﬁrms and ventures
with at least ﬁve employees, respectively, yet account for 30.1 percent of employees and
32.5 percent of wages of new ﬁrms and ventures with director/managers and 21.4 percent
of employees and 25.2 percent of wages for new ﬁrms and ventures with at least ﬁve em-
ployees. This indicates that at time of entry the average diversiﬁcation venture is much
larger than the average new ﬁrm, consistent with the results of Dunne et al. (1988). We
will examine this ﬁnding more closely in the next section. Tables 3 and 4 also show that
director/manager spinoffs and quarter-workforce spinoffs respectively account for 17.0 and
29.3 percent of new ﬁrms with included legal form (i.e. new ﬁrms that belong to the pool of
potential spinoffs). The ranking is to be expected given the greater restrictiveness of the di-
rector/manager spinoff deﬁnition. Finally, we see that director/manager spinoffs account for
24.7 percent of employees and 23.9 percent of wages of new ﬁrms with included legal form,
and quarter-workforce spinoffs account for 32.0 percent of employees and 37.6 percent of
wages of new ﬁrms with included legal form. Both kinds of spinoff are therefore somewhat
larger at time of entry than the average new ﬁrm.
We can assess the overlap between our two spinoff deﬁnitions by considering the subset
of new ﬁrms with included legal form that have both a director/manager and at least ﬁve
employees. There are 41,725 ﬁrms in this subset, of which 10,783 are director/manager
spinoffs, 17,010 are quarter-workforce spinoffs, and 6,386 are both. Thus 59.2 percent
of director/manager spinoffs are also quarter-workforce spinoffs but only 37.5 percent of
quarter-workforce spinoffs are also director/manager spinoffs. This again emphasizes that
13Deﬁnition A is more restrictive than Deﬁnition B.
Table 5 shows frequencies of employee spinoffs, divestitures and unrelated new ﬁrms by
CNAE 1-digit sector in the upper panel. The ﬁrst group of three columns covers the pool of
new ﬁrms with at least one director or manager and the second group of three columns the
pool of new ﬁrms with at least ﬁve employees. In Brazil, roughly half of new ﬁrms occur
in commerce, repair services, hotels and restaurants. The next most frequent 1-digit sector
is real estate activities and business services. Broadly speaking, the sectoral distribution
of new ﬁrms in Brazil is consistent with worldwide survey evidence on entrepreneurship
(Minniti et al. 2005), which ﬁnds that more than 40 percent of entrepreneurship in high-
income countries and more than 60 percent in middle-income countries occurs in consumer-
oriented industries. Interestingly, employee spinoffs, divestitures and unrelated new ﬁrms
exhibit a roughly similar concentration across 1-digit sectors.
In the lower panel of Table 5, we ﬁlter the new ﬁrm’s CNAE 4-digit industry through
the OECD (2001) classiﬁcation of economic activities into high-technology manufacturing
and knowledge-intensive services. The mass of Brazil’s new businesses is launched in non-
high-tech manufacturing and services industries—again with a roughly similar concentration
for employee spinoffs, divestitures and unrelated new ﬁrms. Around 11 percent of direc-
tor/manager employee spinoffs and 15 percent of quarter-workforce spinoffs are started in
knowledge-intensive services (telecommunication, ﬁnance, insurance, business services, ed-
ucation, health). New ﬁrms in the often referenced high-tech manufacturing industries are
relatively rare. Assuringly, the distribution of new ﬁrms across sectors is similar under both
pools of new ﬁrms, those with at least one director or manager and those with at least ﬁve
employees. In the next section we examine the performance of both types of employee
spinoff relative to other new ﬁrms and ventures within the respective pools of new ﬁrms.
6 Employee Spinoff Performance
To understand differences between employee spinoffs, other new ﬁrms and diversiﬁcation
ventures of existing ﬁrms upon entry, we compare measures of their initial size. Table 6
shows regressions for initial size of new ﬁrms with included legal form and diversiﬁcation
ventures. We omit new ﬁrms with excluded legal forms because state or foreign owner-
ship or holding company status are already well known to be associated with larger size.
Columns (1) and (2) cover ﬁrms and ventures that have at least one director or manager and
columns (3) and (4) cover ﬁrms and ventures with at least ﬁve employees. Size is measured
by the log of the number of employees and the log of the wage bill on December 31 of the
calendar year in which the ﬁrm or venture is ﬁrst observed. We drop ﬁrms and ventures
with zero employees on December 31 of their birth years. The key explanatory variables are






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15Table 6: SIZE AT ENTRY
Director/manager Five or more employees
OLS Log Empl. Log Wage Bill Log Empl. Log Wage Bill
(exponentials of coefﬁcients) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Employee spinoff 1.85 1.95 1.12 1.28
(.02)¤¤¤ (.03)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤
Divestiture 2.67 2.95 1.41 1.60
(.07)¤¤¤ (.10)¤¤¤ (.01)¤¤¤ (.02)¤¤¤
Diversiﬁcation venture 3.12 3.89 1.69 2.10
(.06)¤¤¤ (.09)¤¤¤ (.01)¤¤¤ (.02)¤¤¤
Obs. 79,198 79,198 347,709 347,709
R2 .29 .31 .13 .15
Mean Dep. variable 1.75 .40 2.07 .37
CNAE industry panels 552 552 561 561
Cohort panels 7 7 7 7
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms and ventures of existing ﬁrms with at least one manager/director or at
least ﬁve employees. Brazilian Real (BRL) deﬂated to August 1994. Wage bill in BRL thousands.
Notes: Deﬁnition of employee spinoff and divestiture as in Table 2. Deﬁnition of diversiﬁcation venture as in
Table 1. Omitted category: unrelated new ﬁrms. Coefﬁcients reported as exponential functions of coefﬁcients
from OLS regression, standard errors computed with the Delta method, so that reported coefﬁcients capture the
ratios of the sizes relative to unrelated new ﬁrms. All regressions condition on CNAE industry and cohort ﬁxed
effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤ ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent.
for 4-digit CNAE industry and cohort (entry year of ﬁrm or venture).8 The omitted base-
line ﬁrm type is unrelated new ﬁrms. The exponential functions of the coefﬁcients on the
key indicator variables therefore show, within an industry and within a cohort, the ratios of
the sizes of employee spinoffs, divestitures, and diversiﬁcation ventures of existing ﬁrms to
unrelated new ﬁrms.
Diversiﬁcation ventures of existing ﬁrms are three to four times larger than unrelated
new ﬁrms among ﬁrms with directors or managers and about twice as large among ﬁrms
with at least ﬁve employees. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Dunne et al. (1988) for
U.S. manufacturing entrants, who state (p. 504) that “new-ﬁrm entrants in each industry are
on average 28.4% as large as existing producers, while diversifying-ﬁrm, new-plant entrants
are 87.1% ::: as large.” Some of our result is driven by the minority of diversiﬁcation
ventures with multiple plants. However, if we repeat the entire exercise at the plant level
(not shown), diversiﬁcation plants are still two to three times larger than plants of unrelated
new ﬁrms among plants with directors or managers, and 21 percent larger (employees) or
57 percent larger (wage bill) among plants with ﬁve or more employees. In all regressions,
8The industry indicators used as controls in Tables 6-10 are based on the mode sector for new ﬁrms during
their ﬁrst year in the data.
16Table 7: EXIT OF NEW FIRMS AND VENTURES WITH DIRECTOR/MANAGER
Exit by t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employee spinoff -.041 -.075 -.089 -.095 -.096 -.086
(.003)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤¤ (.017)¤¤¤
Divestiture -.051 -.096 -.117 -.144 -.151 -.106
(.005)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤¤ (.015)¤¤¤ (.022)¤¤¤ (.033)¤¤¤
Diversiﬁcation venture -.030 -.043 -.038 -.038 -.033 -.043
(.004)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.009)¤¤¤ (.010)¤¤¤ (.013)¤¤ (.019)¤¤
Obs. 68,395 53,807 40,750 29,148 16,683 8,306
R2 .018 .033 .048 .060 .082 .109
Mean Dep. variable .10 .24 .35 .44 .52 .59
CNAE industry panels 551 544 532 525 508 459
Cohort panels 6 5 4 3 2 1
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms and ventures of existing ﬁrms with at least one manager/director.
Notes: Deﬁnition of employee spinoff (director/manager criterion A only) and divestiture as in Table 2. Deﬁni-
tion of diversiﬁcation venture as in Table 1. Omitted category: unrelated new ﬁrms. All regressions condition
on CNAE industry and cohort ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤ ﬁve,
¤¤¤ one percent.
divestitures are closer in size to diversiﬁcation ventures than to unrelated ﬁrms (the same
holds true at the plant level). This supports our criteria for identifying divestitures since they
should look like ventures of existing ﬁrms rather than new ﬁrms. Employee spinoffs, on the
other hand, are much closer to the entry size of unrelated new ﬁrms than to diversiﬁcation
ventures of existing ﬁrms (though the reverse is true at the plant level). The performance
of director/manager spinoffs relative to diversiﬁcation ventures is somewhat stronger than
that of quarter-workforce spinoffs. Below, we will suggest an interpretation of our spinoff
results in terms of the Jovanovic (1982) model of ﬁrm entry and exit.
A basic measure of performance is survival. Tables 7 and 8 show regressions for the exit
of new ﬁrms with included legal form and diversiﬁcation ventures, covering ﬁrms and ven-
tures with at least one director or manager and ﬁrms and ventures with at least ﬁve employ-
ees, respectively. We estimate a linear probability model, using as dependent variable an exit
indicator that takes the value of one for exiting new ﬁrms or ventures and zero otherwise.9
The mean of the dependent variable is therefore the share of new ﬁrms and diversiﬁcation
ventures that have exited after one through six years, and we see that it rises from 10 to 58
9As explained at the end of Appendix D, a new ﬁrm or venture is not considered to have exited until all its
initial plants have exited. Even then, however, a new ﬁrm’s 8-digit CNPJ root could survive because it has
introduced a new plant. Survival of a ﬁrm’s CNPJ root after exit of all its initial plants is very rare in our data.
Modiﬁcation of our exit deﬁnition for new ﬁrms to take account of this possibility causes the estimated exit
probabilities for new ventures to rise relative to those for new ﬁrms by quantitatively insigniﬁcant amounts.
17Table 8: EXIT OF NEW FIRMS AND VENTURES WITH FIVE OR MORE EMPLOYEES
Exit by t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5 t + 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employee spinoff -.025 -.050 -.061 -.065 -.069 -.066
(.001)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤
Divestiture -.035 -.075 -.095 -.109 -.121 -.116
(.002)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤¤
Diversiﬁcation venture -.023 -.038 -.054 -.063 -.078 -.093
(.002)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.010)¤¤¤
Obs. 307,303 251,930 197,870 145,820 87,883 43,747
R2 .022 .039 .055 .072 .098 .116
Mean Dep. variable .09 .20 .30 .38 .44 .50
CNAE industry panels 561 559 556 553 541 523
Cohort panels 6 5 4 3 2 1
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms and ventures of existing ﬁrms with at least ﬁve employees.
Notes: Deﬁnition of employee spinoff (quarter-workforce criterion B only) and divestiture as in Table 2. Deﬁ-
nition of diversiﬁcation venture as in Table 1. Omitted category: unrelated new ﬁrms. All regressions condition
on CNAE industry and cohort ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤ ﬁve,
¤¤¤ one percent.
percent for ﬁrms and ventures with at least one director or manager and from 9 to 49 percent
for ﬁrms and ventures with at least ﬁve employees. Again, the key explanatory variables are
indicators for employee spinoff, divestiture, and diversiﬁcation venture, alongside controls
for 4-digit CNAE industry and cohort.
In both Tables 7 and 8 the explanatory variables typically have their largest impacts after
ﬁve years, with most of the impacts already felt after three years. In Table 8, a diversiﬁcation
venture is 7 percent less likely to exit than an unrelated new ﬁrm after ﬁve years. This is
again consistent with the ﬁndings of Dunne et al. (1988, p. 513) for U.S. manufacturing
entrants, who compute exit rates for diversiﬁcation ventures from 6 to 14 percent lower than
for new ﬁrms after ﬁve years, depending on cohort. In Table 7, however, the difference
between the exit probabilities of diversiﬁcation ventures and unrelated new ﬁrms fails to rise
after two years, leaving the difference after ﬁve years much smaller than in Table 8. We
do not have an explanation for this ﬁnding, especially since nothing similar happens for the
relative exit probabilities of employee spinoffs and divestitures.10 The exit performance of
divestitures is even stronger than for diversiﬁcation ventures in Table 8. In Table 7, the exit
probabilities of divestitures are as much as 14 percent lower than for unrelated new ﬁrms.
10If we restrict Table 7 to new ﬁrms and ventures with ﬁve or more employees, the results do not qualitatively
change. Thus it is the director/manager ﬁlter that generates the unexpected exit behavior for diversiﬁcation
ventures.
18Table 9: EXIT OF NEW FIRMS AND VENTURES WITH DIRECTOR/MANAGER: ADDI-
TIONAL SPECIFICATIONS
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Exit by t + 1 t + 5 t + 1 t + 5 t + 1 t + 5
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employee spinoff -.035 -.085 -.019 -.060 -.023 -.062
(.003)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.012)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.013)¤¤¤
Divestiture -.044 -.138 -.019 -.096 -.024 -.091
(.005)¤¤¤ (.022)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.022)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.023)¤¤¤
Diversiﬁcation venture -.025 -.025 .007 .031 .005 .035
(.004)¤¤¤ (.013)¤ (.004) (.013)¤¤ (.005) (.014)¤¤
Share: Trackable employees -.041 -.078 -.028 -.051 -.002 -.048
(.005)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤ (.014)¤¤¤ (.008) (.024)¤¤
Log initial employment -.028 -.050 -.024 -.049
(.0009)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.003)¤¤¤
Share: Shifted parent employees .003 .003
(.002) (.002)
Obs. 68,395 16,683 68,395 16,683 47,659 12,452
R2 .020 .083 .033 .099 .031 .103
Mean Dep. variable .10 .52 .10 .52 .09 .49
CNAE industry panels 551 508 551 508 548 495
Cohort panels 6 2 6 2 6 2
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms and ventures of existing ﬁrms with at least one manager/director.
Notes: Deﬁnition of employee spinoff (director/manager criterion A only) and divestiture as in Table 2. Deﬁni-
tion of diversiﬁcation venture as in Table 1. Omitted category: unrelated new ﬁrms. All regressions condition
on CNAE industry and cohort ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤ ﬁve,
¤¤¤ one percent.
Finally, Tables 7 and 8 respectively show that Deﬁnition A and B employee spinoffs have
exit probabilities as much as nine and seven percent lower than unrelated ﬁrms.11
Our aim in this section is to establish stylized facts regarding employee spinoff perfor-
mance relative to other new ﬁrms and ventures rather than test hypotheses about relative
performance. Nevertheless, there is a mechanical reason why Deﬁnition A and especially
Deﬁnition B spinoffs should show better performance, and we would like to control for this.
Application of both deﬁnitions requires that we be able to track workers at a new ﬁrm to
previous employment. Mechanically, then, employees at a Deﬁnition A and especially Def-
11A potential concern is that the superior performance of employee spinoffs relative to unrelated new ﬁrms
is driven by ﬁrms with gray area legal form, for which the classiﬁcation of new ﬁrms as employee spinoffs is
less certain. We reran our size and exit regressions for ﬁrms with spinoff legal form only, therefore dropping
divestitures. The differences in initial size and exit probabilities between employee spinoffs and unrelated new
ﬁrms were qualitatively unchanged.
19Table 10: EXIT OF NEW FIRMS AND VENTURES WITH FIVE OR MORE EMPLOYEES:
ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3
Exit by t + 1 t + 5 t + 1 t + 5 t + 1 t + 5
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employee spinoff -.022 -.066 -.023 -.069 -.024 -.068
(.001)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤
Divestiture -.033 -.119 -.030 -.116 -.028 -.102
(.002)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.013)¤¤¤
Diversiﬁcation venture -.021 -.077 -.016 -.066 -.014 -.060
(.002)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤
Share: Trackable employees -.017 -.013 -.011 -.001 -.013 -.008
(.003)¤¤¤ (.008)¤ (.003)¤¤¤ (.008) (.003)¤¤¤ (.009)
Log initial employment -.012 -.024 -.011 -.025
(.0006)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.0007)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤
Share: Shifted parent employees -.0004 -.010
(.001) (.009)
Obs. 307,303 87,883 307,303 87,883 267,989 78,073
R2 .022 .098 .023 .099 .024 .104
Mean Dep. variable .09 .43 .09 .43 .08 .43
CNAE industry panels 561 541 561 541 561 540
Cohort panels 6 2 6 2 6 2
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms and ventures of existing ﬁrms with at least ﬁve employees.
Notes: Deﬁnition of employee spinoff (quarter-workforce criterion B only) and divestiture as in Table 2. Deﬁ-
nition of diversiﬁcation venture as in Table 1. Omitted category: unrelated new ﬁrms. All regressions condition
on CNAE industry and cohort ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤ ﬁve,
¤¤¤ one percent.
inition B spinoff are more likely than employees at an unrelated new ﬁrm to have formal
sector work experience. It would not be surprising if such ﬁrms were to survive in the for-
mal sector longer. In the ﬁrst two columns of Tables 9 and 10, therefore, we add a control
variable for the share of new ﬁrm or venture employees that are “trackable”. As expected,
a greater share of trackable employees is associated with reduced exit probabilities for both
new ﬁrms and ventures with at least one director or manager and new ﬁrms and ventures
with at least ﬁve employees. However, the impact on exit probabilities of spinoffs is only
slightly reduced in both tables.12
Are the lower exit probabilities of employee spinoffs (and divestitures and diversiﬁcation
ventures) relative to unrelated new ﬁrms explained by their larger initial sizes? To answer
this question we add the log of the number of initial employees as a control variable in the
12The mean of “share trackable” for new ﬁrms is 61.4 percent.
20third and fourth columns of Tables 9 and 10.13 This is indeed associated with lower exit
probabilities in both tables. The impact on exit probabilities of diversiﬁcation ventures with
at least ﬁve employees is slightly reduced, but the impacts on exit probabilities of employee
spinoffs and divestitures with at least ﬁve employees are unchanged. There are greater
changes for new ﬁrms and ventures with at least one director or manager. For employee
spinoffs and divestitures, impacts on exit probabilities are now slightly below those for the
same categories with at least ﬁve employees. For diversiﬁcation ventures, impacts on exit
probabilities are now slightly positive, maintaining the unexpected exit behavior for diver-
siﬁcation ventures with at least one director or manager. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
lower exit probabilities of employee spinoffs relative to unrelated new ﬁrms are an element
of superior performance over and above greater entry size.
Finally, it is possible that some of the apparently better performance of employee spinoffs
relative to unrelated new ﬁrms results from an overly restrictive deﬁnition for divestitures. In
other words, some employee spinoffs may actually be planned divestitures even though they
contain less than 70 percent of the employees of any plant of their parent ﬁrm. To control
for this possibility, in the ﬁfth and sixth columns of Tables 9 and 10 we add a variable for the
share of employees of the plant of the parent ﬁrm from which the new ﬁrm or venture absorbs
the most workers.14 This variable has a negative association with exit probabilities at the
longer time horizon for new ﬁrms and ventures with at least ﬁve employees but a positive
association with exit probabilities at the short time horizon for new ﬁrms and ventures with
at least one director or manager; but no association is statistically signiﬁcant. In all cases
the coefﬁcients for employee spinoffs are unaffected.15
Exit does not necessarily imply failure. A new ﬁrm may be acquired by another ﬁrm
and thereby earn its founders a tidy return. We deﬁne an exiting new ﬁrm or venture as
absorbed if at least 70 percent of the exiting ﬁrm’s workforce is contracted by another ﬁrm
during the year of exit; otherwise we call the exit a shutdown. For a meaningful application
of the 70-percent deﬁnition, we restrict the sample to new ﬁrms and ventures with at least ﬁve
employees. When we restrict the regression sample to shutdowns and survivors (dropping
absorptions from the sample) in columns 3 and 4 of Table 11, the inferior performance of
unrelated new ﬁrms becomes even starker, and diversiﬁcation ventures show the largest dif-
ference between shutdown rates and general exit rates. We restrict the regression sample to
13Initial employees in these tables include all founding employees with a job at the new ﬁrm at any time
during the ﬁrst year, rather than in December only.
14For an unrelated new ﬁrm in Table 9, a “parent” is just the existing ﬁrm from which the new ﬁrm received
its top employee. For an unrelated new ﬁrm in Table 10, a parent is just the existing ﬁrm from which the new
ﬁrm absorbs the most workers, where “most” could be as low as one. The number of observations drops in
these columns because many unrelated new ﬁrms lack (identiﬁable) parent ﬁrms.
15It is also possible that some of the apparently better performance of employee spinoffs relative to unrelated
new ﬁrms results from workers who maintain concurrent employments at parent and spinoff so that spinoffs
keep a close connection to parents. Accordingly, we include the share of concurrent employees at parent and
spinoff in regressions like those in Tables 9 and 10 (not reported). The concurrent-employment regressor itself
is statistically insigniﬁcant, and coefﬁcients for employee spinoffs are unaffected.
21Table 11: SHUTDOWN AND ABSORPTION OF NEW FIRMS AND VENTURES WITH FIVE
OR MORE EMPLOYEES
Any Exit Shutdown Absorption
Exit by t + 1 t + 5 t + 1 t + 5 t + 1 t + 5
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Employee spinoff -.025 -.069 -.032 -.082 .007 .024
(.001)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.004)¤¤¤ (.0004)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤
Divestiture -.035 -.121 -.041 -.138 .006 .024
(.002)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.008)¤¤¤ (.0009)¤¤¤ (.005)¤¤¤
Diversiﬁcation venture -.023 -.078 -.040 -.117 .019 .083
(.002)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.002)¤¤¤ (.007)¤¤¤ (.001)¤¤¤ (.006)¤¤¤
Obs. 307,303 87,883 305,078 85,154 282,311 51,955
R2 .022 .098 .025 .104 .010 .043
Mean Dep. variable .09 .44 .08 .42 .008 .05
CNAE industry panels 561 541 561 541 561 541
Cohort panels 6 2 6 2 6 2
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms and ventures of existing ﬁrms with at least ﬁve employees.
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 restate results from Table 8, subsample in columns 3 and 4 excludes absorptions,
subsample in columns 5 and 6 excludes shutdowns. Deﬁnition of absorption: 70 percent of exiting ﬁrm’s
workforce shift to another ﬁrm (exit is shutdown otherwise). Deﬁnition of employee spinoff (quarter-workforce
criterion B only) and divestiture as in Table 2. Deﬁnition of diversiﬁcation venture as in Table 1. Omitted
category: unrelated new ﬁrms. All regressions condition on CNAE industry and cohort ﬁxed effects. Robust
standard errors in parentheses: ¤ signiﬁcance at ten, ¤¤ ﬁve, ¤¤¤ one percent.
absorptions and survivors (dropping shutdowns from the sample) in columns 5 and 6. Com-
pared to unrelated new ﬁrms, spinoffs and divestitures are more likely to be absorbed, and
diversiﬁcation ventures are three to four times more likely to be absorbed than are spinoffs
or divestitures.16
Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989, p. 679) interpret their ﬁndings regarding the per-
formance of diversiﬁcation ventures relative to new ﬁrms in terms of the Jovanovic (1982)
model of ﬁrm entry and exit. In their view a diversiﬁcation venture inherits the unobserved
productivity parameter of its parent and the posterior distribution of that parameter. Since
the parent is selected for high productivity relative to the typical new ﬁrm by virtue of hav-
ing survived for some period of time, the diversiﬁcation venture is also selected for relatively
high productivity and therefore relatively large size at entry. Moreover, the variance of the
posterior distribution inherited by the diversiﬁcation venture will be lower than the variance
of the distribution for a new ﬁrm, and therefore it is less likely that the diversiﬁcation venture
will draw a low productivity realization that causes it to exit.
16Of those entrants that are absorbed, 45 percent of diversiﬁcation ventures are absorbed by their parents
compared to 28 percent of spinoffs and 26 percent of divestitures.
22A natural extension of the reasoning of Dunne et al. (1989) to employee spinoffs is to
assume that a spinoff’s unobserved productivity parameter is a convex combination of the
productivity parameter of an unrelated new ﬁrm and its parent ﬁrm, and that its posterior
distribution of that parameter is likewise a mixture of the distributions for an unrelated new
ﬁrm and its parent ﬁrm. This will yield size at entry and exit rates that are in between
those of unrelated new ﬁrms and those of diversiﬁcation ventures. This interpretation is
consistent with the idea that employees take knowledge from parent ﬁrms to spinoffs, but
that the knowledge is not necessarily alienable intellectual property as in the literature on
high-tech spinoffs.
7 Conclusion
Employee spinoffs have been found to be an important type of new businesses in many
economies. Existing ﬁrms continuously lose employees, some of whom spin off to start
their own businesses. Rich linked employer-employee data for Brazil allow us to systemat-
ically compare employee spinoffs to other new businesses, including management-initiated
divestitures, and to diversiﬁcation ventures of existing ﬁrms. While the relevance and per-
formance of divestitures (Cusatis et al. 1993, e.g.) and diversiﬁcation ventures of existing
ﬁrms (Dunne et al. 1988, e.g.) has been well documented before, we are able for the ﬁrst
time to separately identify employee spinoffs through workforce-based deﬁnitions that draw
on employer-reported occupations, ﬁrm identiﬁers and industry classiﬁcations, as well as
ﬁrms’ legal forms and mass employment shifts between ﬁrms.
Under one criterion, employee spinoffs are deﬁned as new ﬁrms whose top salaried di-
rector or manager moved from a parent in the same industry. Under a second criterion,
employee spinoffs are deﬁned as new ﬁrms that ﬁll at least a quarter of their jobs with work-
ers who shifted from a common parent. Our ﬁndings are largely consistent across the two
employee-spinoff deﬁnitions and lend mutual support to the deﬁnitions. Additional restric-
tions set employee spinoffs apart from divestitures and other new businesses. Depending on
deﬁnition, employee spinoffs account for between one-sixth and one-third of the respective
new ﬁrms in Brazil’s private sector during this period. Employee spinoffs grow into impor-
tant employers. Considering the entry of employee spinoffs with at least a quarter of their
workforce from a common parent between 1995 and 2001, for instance, shows that their total
employment reaches 5.4 percent of overall formal-sector employment by 2001.
Size at entry is larger for employee spinoffs than for new ﬁrms without parents but
smaller than for diversiﬁcation ventures of existing ﬁrms. Similarly, exit rates for employee
spinoffs are less than for new ﬁrms without parents and comparable to those for diversiﬁca-
tion ventures of existing ﬁrms. These results suggest that we can think of some part of a
ﬁrm’s productivity draw in the Jovanovic (1982) model as embodied in the ﬁrm’s employees
and portable by them to a new ﬁrm.
Our ﬁndings have potentially important implications even beyond ﬁrm dynamics and en-
23trepreneurial policy. For example, using our quarter-workforce spinoff deﬁnition, Muendler
and Rauch (2009) identify parent ﬁrms that spawn both employee spinoff plants and expan-
sion or diversiﬁcation plants, and show that spinoff plants locate even closer to their parents
than the parents’ own new plants, controlling for sector, the share of initial employees from
the parent, and initial plant size. This supports the argument of Klepper (2009), based on
case studies of the U.S. automobile industry in Detroit and the U.S. semiconductor indus-
try in Silicon Valley, that employee spinoffs can play a key role in the initiation of industry
clusters. We hope that our quantiﬁcation of the employee spinoff phenomenon encourages
further research into all its impacts.
24Appendix
A Employer-employee Data
Screening of employee data. Employees in RAIS are identiﬁed by the individual-speciﬁc
PIS number (Programa de Integrac ¸˜ ao Social). A given plant may report the same PIS mul-
tiple times within a single year so that the employee can withdraw from the employer-funded
severance pay account (FGTS) through spurious layoffs and rehires. In addition, some PIS
values (especially very small or symmetric numbers) are recorded by an unrealistically large
number of different plants. To handle these issues, we devise a systematic way to label PIS
values that we think should not be trusted for tracking employee’s employment histories: if
an employee appears at more than twelve jobs in any given year, or if there is more than one
apparent gender change (i.e. there are two or more years in the data when the employee is
listed as being of both genders), we mark the employee has having an invalid PIS. None of
the 14,272 employees caught by this rule is deleted from the data. Instead, we only disre-
gard their work history for purposes of identifying the parent of a new ﬁrm and for deﬁning
spinoffs.
To avoid double-counting employees at new ﬁrms, we keep only one observation for each
employer-employee-year combination, choosing the job with the earliest hiring date. If the
employee has two jobs at the ﬁrm starting in the same month, we keep the highest paying
one (randomly dropping observations in case of ties). For new ventures of existing ﬁrms, we
apply this rule at the plant-year level, thus allowing the employee to appear once per plant
during the plant’s ﬁrst year,17 again choosing the job with the earliest hiring date and highest
wage.
To compute the December performance measures (employment and wage bill) as re-
ported in Tables 3 and 4, and as employed on the left-hand side in Table 6, we choose a
modiﬁed version of the data cleaning described above. Instead of allowing only one ob-
servation per worker per year at the new ﬁrm or plant, we allow only one observation per
worker on December 31 at the given ﬁrm or plant (in the job with the top December wage).
This way we make sure that we do not lose from our December count any employees who
worked in a different occupation at the ﬁrm earlier in the year.
Earnings. We use the reported December wage as our earnings measure, which is recorded
in multiples of the monthly minimum wage that prevails at the time. The reported December
wage in RAIS excludes the “thirteenth salary,” which is a special December payment made
in some sectors. Multiplying our reported December wage ﬁgures by twelve provides a
good estimate of an annual wage. We calculate the wage value in Brazilian Real (BRL)
17In plant-level analysis, we apply this rule at the plant-year level for both new plants of new ﬁrms and new
plants of existing ﬁrms.
25and deﬂate all wages to August 1994, when Brazil adopted a new monetary regime with
single-digit annual inﬂation rates (starting with a BRL value at par with the U.S. dollar).
The RAIS manual for respondents states explicitly the forms of payment that are con-
sidered valid components of the monthly wage rate. These include: salaries; extraordinary
additions, supplements and bonuses; tips and gratuities; commissions and fees; contracted
premia; overtime earnings for contracted extra hours; hazard earnings; executive earnings;
cost reimbursement components if they exceed ﬁfty percent of the base salary and are for
travel or transfers necessary for the execution of the job; payments for periods of vacation,
holidays and parental leave; vacation gratuities if they exceed twenty days of salary; piece
wages; and in-kind remunerations such as room and board. As a rule, components are con-
sidered part of salary if they are taxable income or are subject to Brazilian social security
contributions.
Payments that are not considered wage components include: severance payments for lay-
offs; indemnity payments for permanent maternal leave and any other indemnity payments;
so-called “family payments” under Brazilian labor law; vacation gratuities if they do not
exceed twenty days of salary; additional social security earnings due to an employee’s ill-
ness; moving expenses; travel cost reimbursements if they do not exceed ﬁfty percent of the
base salary; scholarships for interns; meals, equipment and clothing for execution of the job;
participation in the employer’s proﬁts; and so-called pro-labore payments for services by
owners who do not have a dependent employment relationship.
Occupations. Occupations are categorized using the so-called CBO classiﬁcation codes
in RAIS. For our implementation, it is not necessary to reclassify CBO codes to conform
with the ISCO-88 categories. Our main use of the occupational coding is to identify direc-
tors/managers. The Portuguese title ‘diretor geral’, for instance, is similar to the occupation
of a CEO, ‘diretor de ﬁnancas’ similar to CFO.
B Firm Identiﬁers
Consistent application of ﬁrm identiﬁers is crucial for our identiﬁcation of new plants and
ﬁrms. Plant-level information in RAIS is based on the CNPJ identiﬁcation number, where
CNPJ (‘cadastro nacional de pesso juridica’) stands for Brazil’s national register of legal
juristic persons. The ﬁrst eight digits of CNPJ numbers (CNPJ radical) deﬁne the ﬁrm and
the subsequent six digits the plant/branch within the ﬁrm. The CNPJ number is assigned
or extinguished, and pertaining register information updated, under legally precisely deﬁned
conditions.
The CNPJ number is administered by the Brazilian tax authority Receita Federal, the
Brazilian equivalent to the U.S. IRS. In the CNPJ register, Receita Federal maintains infor-
mation related to the ﬁrm’s legal form and related matters, which is separately also recorded
in RAIS. The following nine types of transactions either trigger the creation or extinction
26of CNPJ numbers, or updating of the register while maintaining CNPJ numbers. Once
extinguished, a CNPJ number cannot be reassigned to any other plant in the future.
1. Opening a business, becoming a juristic person. Obtain CNPJ. It is required of any
juristic person (‘pessoa juridica’) in Brazil, a legal entity in Brazilian common and
commercial law, to register a CNPJ number with the Receita Federal upon opening a
business.18
2. Change in business name (‘nome empresarial’), or business sector (‘porte da empresa’),
or legal form (‘natureza juridica’). Maintain CNPJ, update register information.
Changes from individual entrepreneurs to associations or partnerships of entrepreneurs
and owners, or the reverse, do not result in reported changes in legal form.
3. Change in ownership (‘quadro de s´ ocios’) at associations and partnerships, or change
in management (‘administradores’), or change in equity holding at associations and
partnerships (‘inclus˜ ao e alterac ¸˜ ao de capital social’). Maintain CNPJ, update regis-
ter information. Note that changes to incorporated ﬁrms—juristic persons with inde-
pendent legal existence such as a limited liability company (‘sociedade por quotas de
responsabilidade limitada’)—are treated differently, see 8 below.
4. Other changes to the register, including mothballing (‘interrupc ¸˜ ao tempor´ aria de ativi-
dades’) and resumption of operations (‘rein´ ıcio das atividades interrompidas tempo-
rariamente’), a change in tax status (‘opc ¸˜ ao ou exclus˜ ao do simples’, ‘qualiﬁcac ¸˜ ao
tribut´ aria’), a change of responsible physical person (human being) for the CNPJ
juristic person (‘pessoa f´ ısica respons´ avel perante o CNPJ’), and several other ad-
ministrative cases. Maintain CNPJ, update register information.
5. Bankruptcy and liquidation. Maintain CNPJ, update register information. It pertains to
the Receita Federal to administer the CNPJ of the extinguished juristic person. Liqui-
dation may be by court order or extrajudicial settlement. The opening and closing of
a bankruptcy case must be reported.
6. Opening new plants/branches. New plants or branches are registered with the individual
CNPJ numbers, where the ﬁrst eight digits (CNPJ radical) deﬁne the ﬁrm and the
subsequent six digits the plant/branch within the ﬁrm.
7. Partial divestiture/corporate spinout (‘cis˜ ao parcial’). Maintain CNPJ, update register
information. The newly independent ﬁrm (divestiture or spinout) receives an own
CNPJ. In practice, a partial divestiture might coincide with the acquisition of an indi-
vidual plant by another ﬁrm.
18There is also a set of legal entities that are not formally juristic persons but are put on equal legal footing
withjuristicpersonsbyReceitaFederal, includingrealestatecondominiums, mutualfunds, employerconsortia,
and foreign consulates.
278. Merger of ﬁrm with other ﬁrm (‘fus˜ ao’), acquisition of ﬁrm by other ﬁrm (‘incorporac ¸˜ ao’)
or complete divestiture/corporate spinout into newly independent ﬁrms (‘cis˜ ao total’).
Extinguish CNPJ of ﬁrm that undergoes change. In the case of mergers and complete
divestitures, the newly independent ﬁrm(s) obtain CNPJ(s) of their own. In the case
of a plant acquisition, if the divested plant is not incorporated as a ﬁrm, the acquiring
ﬁrm’s CNPJ radical is retained and six new digits for the new plant are added. Note
that the above applies to the acquisition of the ﬁrm as a whole, not select plants within
the ﬁrm (for those cases see 7).
9. Inactivity since day of foundation (‘empresa que n˜ ao iniciou atividades (inativa desde a
abertura)’). Extinguish CNPJ.
Important for employee spinoffs, a change in ownership at associations or partnerships
does not result in a change in CNPJ, as explained under item 3. Divestitures by Deﬁni-
tion C include both management-initiated offspring that become standalone ﬁrms (corporate
spinouts or complete splitups (‘cis˜ ao total’)) and management-initiated offspring from par-
ent ﬁrms’ M&A activity (such as a merger (‘fus˜ ao’), an acquisition (‘incorporac ¸˜ ao’), and a
partial splitup (‘cis˜ ao parcial’)). These are covered under items 7 and 8.
C Natureza Juridica (Legal Form)
By our Deﬁnitions A and B, employee spinoffs are employee-initiated offspring ﬁrms whose
key employees stem from one or multiple legally separate parent ﬁrms. We choose our
empirical implementation such that it is unlikely that parent ﬁrms or acquiring companies
hold a capital stake in the employee spinoff (the employee spinoff may or may not face
contractual obligations with the parent ﬁrm). For this purpose, we use the natureza juridica
(legal form) variable in RAIS to discern three important types of legal form: associations
or partnerships without independent legal existence, private incorporated ﬁrms, and types of
incorporated ﬁrms to be excluded from analysis. Associations or partnerships can only be
owned by physical persons, not by other companies. There is minor reporting error in legal
form: around .1 percent of new ﬁrms have more than one (non-missing) legal form in their
ﬁrst year. We assign the mode of its legal form during the year to every ﬁrm.
Table C.1 shows the frequency of natureza juridica among new ﬁrms. More than 97 per-
cent of new ﬁrms are concentrated in just four legal forms: limited liability companies with
56 percent, sole-proprietor companies with 32 percent, non-proﬁt organizations (5 percent)
and for-proﬁt associations (4 percent). Only the limited liability company is an incorporated
legal type that can be owned by another company, whereas the remaining three legal forms
among the top four are associations or partnerships without independent legal existence. As
mentioned, associations or partnerships can only be owned by physical persons. The latter
three legal forms are thus also not subject to CNPJ changes, see item 3 in the preceding
Appendix. We consider the latter three legal forms highly likely employee spinoffs if they
28Table C.1: TREATMENT OF LEGAL FORM
Treatment
Spin- Gray Ex- RAIS
Natureza Juridica (legal form) off area clude Total codes
Public administration x 6,718 .4% 1015-1996
State-owned companya x 16,909 1.1% 2011-2038
Corporation x 4,110 .3% 2046, 2054
Limited liability company x 867,656 56.2% 2062
Partnership x 3,008 .2% 2070-2100,2127
For-proﬁt association x 47,193 3.1% 2119
Sole-proprietor companyb x 493,130 32.0% 2135, 2992
Cooperative x 3,553 .2% 2143
Consortium x 318 .02% 2151
Business group x 436 .03% 2160
Branch of foreign company x 153 .01% 2178
Non-proﬁt organization x 77,616 5.0% 3018-3999
Professional without employeesc x 379 .02% 4030
Professional with employeesc x 4,880 .3% 4049
Entrepreneurial proprietor x 1,518 .1% 4073
Other professionalc x 2,408 .2% 4014-4995d
Unknown x 13,662 .9% .
Total 1,543,647 100.0%
aState-owned limited liability company and close corporation, and Corporation with some state control.
bIncludes other private businesses.
cIncludes self employment.
dExcluding above codes.
Source: RAIS 1995-2001, new ﬁrms.
Note: Gray area legal forms underly Deﬁnition C. Excluded legal forms underly Deﬁnition D.
satisfy the criteria of Deﬁnitions A or B. We return to the use of natureza juridica in our
description of spinoff and divestiture deﬁnitions below.
D Implementation of Spinoff and Divestiture Deﬁnitions
We apply two distinct sets of spinoff criteria (Deﬁnitions A and B), each administered at the
ﬁrm level (ﬁrst eight digits of the CNPJ tax number).19 To identify a potential parent ﬁrm,
we use the job histories of the new ﬁrm’s founding employees, where the founding employees
19In robustness checks where we administer the spinoff deﬁnitions A and B at the plant-level, we apply the
two criteria to new ﬁrm-plants using the full CNPJ code as identiﬁer.
29are the individuals employed at the ﬁrm during its ﬁrst year in RAIS.20 In particular, we look
at each of the founding employee’s previous substantial job, which we identify in the data
as the last preceding employment spell (by hiring month) with a duration of at least three
months.21 We search for the previous job as far back as the RAIS data allows us. Our data
start in 1986, which gives us nine years of potential labor market experience before 1995,
the year in which we ﬁrst consider ﬁrm entries.
Director/manager spinoff. The director/manager deﬁnition (A) isolates the top employee
at each new ﬁrm ﬁrst by job description (where director trumps manager, which trumps
other descriptions), and secondarily by wage. The previous ﬁrm at which this top employee
worked for at least three months is identiﬁed as the new ﬁrm’s parent. If this parent is within
the same disaggregated industry (same 4-digit CNAE sector of which there are 654) as the
new ﬁrm, and the top employee is a manager or director, we label the new ﬁrm a spinoff.
For this purpose, we do not compare mode industries of the parent and new ﬁrm (since the
parent ﬁrm may operate plants in several industries); instead we use the industries associated
with the transferring top employee at her old and new job. If either of the two industries
is missing, the spinoff deﬁnition is not satisﬁed. If there are two or more director/manager
employees tied for top employee, the ﬁrm is labeled a spinoff if any one (or all) of these
employee’s parent ﬁrms is in the same industry as the new ﬁrm. So multi-parent spinoffs
are possible, but they are rare in practice (multi-parent spinoffs represent 0.7 percent of all
director/manager spinoffs). This deﬁnition is only applied to new ﬁrms with management-
levelemployees, ofwhichthereare78,838(orabout5percentoftheentirenew-ﬁrmsample).
Quarter-workforce spinoff. The quarter-workforce deﬁnition (B) considers the previous
place of substantive employment (lasting at least three months) of all the new ﬁrm’s employ-
ees, regardless of job description or pay. The parent ﬁrm is the ﬁrm that supplied the largest
number of employees to the new ﬁrm. The new ﬁrm is labelled a spinoff as long as 25 per-
cent or more of the new ﬁrm’s employees come from the parent ﬁrm. This deﬁnition would
trivially label as spinoffs all ﬁrms with four or fewer initial employees, therefore we only
apply it to the 340,856 new ﬁrms (out of 1.5 million) with ﬁve or more initial employees.
Multi-parent spinoffs are again possible (they constitute 4.7 percent of the quarter-workforce
spinoffs).
For both deﬁnitions (A and B), if there are two or more parent ﬁrms (multi-parent
spinoff), we keep the parent within the same industry for purposes of testing the mass em-
ployee shift criterion (Deﬁnition C). Any remaining ties are broken at random to select a
unique parent.
20Firm age comparisons with other data sources show that RAIS reports date of ﬁrm creation plausibly
precisely. In plant-level robustness analysis, we identify the parent plant.
21If the employee started two or more jobs in a month, we select the highest paying job, randomly dropping
ties. We also require that the previous employment spell is at a different ﬁrm than the new ﬁrm at which the
worker is currently employed.
30Legal form of new ﬁrm. We further use legal form data (the mode calculated for each new
ﬁrm) to discern clear employee spinoffs, a gray area, and clear non-spinoffs. As described
above (Appendix C), incorporated ﬁrms can be owned by other companies and can thus be
subject to CNPJ changes as ownership changes (Appendix B). We treat new ﬁrms that are
incorporated as gray-area ﬁrms because management-initiated divestitures could be a motive
of their creation (natureza juridica 2046, 2054 or 2062, or unknown). In contrast, personal
businesses such as associations and partnerships cannot be owned by other companies under
Brazilian commercial law, and are thus not subject to CNPJ changes. We therefore consider
associations and partnerships as highly likely employee spinoffs if they satisfy the spinoff
deﬁnitions (natureza juridica 2070-2135, 2992, 3018-3999, 4014-4995). We exclude from
the analysis legal forms that designate employers as public administration (natureza juridica
1015-1996), state-owned companies or corporations with some state control (2011-2038)
or as special companies such as cooperatives, consortia, business groups and branches of
foreign companies (2143-2178). Table C.1 documents that the bulk of new ﬁrms’ legal
forms are included: 56.5 percent of new ﬁrms fall into the gray area and 40.8 percent of new
ﬁrms are highly likely spinoffs.
We apply the following reﬁnement to our two spinoff deﬁnitions. A ﬁrm is a spinoff if a
spinoff deﬁnition is satisﬁed (Deﬁnition A or B) and the legal form of the new ﬁrm is clearly
spinoff. A ﬁrm is also a spinoff if the spinoff deﬁnition is satisﬁed, the legal form of the
new ﬁrm is gray area, and strictly less than 70 percent of the parent plant’s workforce shift
to the new ﬁrm. We now turn to the latter mass-employee shift criterion that distinguishes
spinoffs from divestitures.
Divestitures, including corporate spinouts. If 70 percent or more of a parent plant’s
workforce switch to a new CNPJ from one year to the next, we call the new plant a di-
vestiture plant. We impose no minimum size on a parent ﬁrm for this computation. This
deﬁnition is based on an employee count at the parent, contrary to our spinoff deﬁnitions
which are based on employee counts at the new ﬁrm. In particular, we identify the parent
at the ﬁrm level and single out the parent-ﬁrm’s plant with the highest fraction of employees
that shift to a new ﬁrm.22 The denominator in the share of shifting workers is the count of
substantive parent employees over the year prior to the new ﬁrm’s entry.23 If the new ﬁrm
has no trackable employees, or if the parent ﬁrm did not appear in RAIS during the previous
year, we cannot calculate the share of parent plant employees that shifted, and we assume
that the value is below 70 percent.
The 70-percent cutoff is motivated by the reverse of the labor economists’ deﬁnition
of a mass layoff (e.g. Jacobson et al. 1993), by which 30 percent or more of the existing
workforce experience a separation. We label all divestiture ﬁrms that originate from 70
22In plant-level robustness analysis, the parent is also identiﬁed at the plant level, so there is no further
selection necessary.
23We count parent plant employees as follows. We disregard employment spells of less than three months,
and we keep only one appearance of any given employee per year per plant.
31percent of a parent plant’s workforce with an according indicator in the data. So, we call
a ﬁrm a divestiture if the legal form of the new ﬁrm is gray area and at least 70 percent of
the parent plant’s workforce switch to the new ﬁrm. The share of parent plant employees
that shift to the new ﬁrm is also used as an added control in exit probability regressions. For
those regressions, we also need to construct the share of shifting workers at new ventures
of existing ﬁrms. For new ventures, the parent ﬁrm is simply the 8-digit root part of the
existing ﬁrm’s CNPJ number. Similar to divestitures, we select the parent plant with the
highest share of its employees lost to the new venture to calculate the denominator for the
share of shifting workers.
Unrelated startup ﬁrms. Firms with included legal form that do not fall into the spinoff
or divestiture categories are in the outside comparison group.
New ventures of existing ﬁrms. During our sample period 1995-2001, 580,557 new plants
are started at 152,694 existing ﬁrms. We divide these into expansion plants (same 4-digit
CNAE industry as parent ﬁrm), diversiﬁcation plants (different 4-digit CNAE industry), and
plants for which we cannot perform the sector comparison (because either the new plant or
the parent ﬁrm has no known sector). The parent ﬁrm’s industry is the ﬁrm’s mode CNAE
sector during the immediately preceding year in the data. An expansion or diversiﬁcation
venture of an existing ﬁrm is the sum of its expansion or diversiﬁcation plants. Analogously
tonewﬁrms, anewventurepassesthedirector/managerﬁlterifanyofitsplantshasadirector
or manager, and a new venture passes the ﬁve or more employees ﬁlter if the sum of its plants
has ﬁve or more employees.
Mode sector assignment. For regression purposes, we assign to each ﬁrm (or plant) its
mode sector value for that year, computed over the raw data and over all employees (not just
December-31 employees). Many ﬁrms with no employees in December of a given year go
on to have a workforce in December of future years. Of the new ﬁrms from 1995 that survive
through 2001, for instance, more than seven percent had zero employment on December 31
of 1995. We would lose many observations in performance regressions controlling for initial
year sector if we only based the sector on December-31 employees. For new ventures of
existing ﬁrms, we compute the mode sector as follows: we take the mode sectors of its plants,
weigh them by the number of employees of each plant, and compute the mode. New ﬁrms or
ventures with no known sector are not excluded from regressions, instead they are included
under a common “unknown sector” category.
Exit. We adopt the following exit deﬁnition for the regressions in Tables 7 through 10: a
plant is considered active (has not yet exited) in a year t if it has any employment at any time
during year t or during any of the following years t + ¿. A new ﬁrm or venture survives as
long as any of its initial plants is still active. We deﬁne the exit indicator variable exit(t+¿)
32to be 0 if the new ﬁrm or venture has not yet exited at year t + ¿, and to be 1 if it exited
in t + ¿ or in a previous year. The exit indicator is only deﬁned for ﬁrms and ventures for
which it is possible to test survival. For instance, since our data end in 2001, exit(t + 5) is
only deﬁned for ﬁrms and ventures that enter in 1995 or 1996.24
24Note also that this means that we underestimate survival for ﬁrms and ventures entering later in the sample
because it is possible for a ﬁrm or venture to be absent from the data on one year and to re-appear in following
years.
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